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Sometimes the grass is greener on the other side: How terrorism affects preference for democracy
Revise and resubmit.
Abstract: I study how negative signals about states' capacity to provide security, i.e. terrorism, affect preference for democracy. I argue that negative signals affect preference formation differently conditional on how democratic a regime is perceived to be. Using interrupted surveys from several African countries, I show that preference for democracy increases in response to terrorist attacks. This effect is particularly pronounced among individuals who evaluate their state as undemocratic. Individuals who perceive their state as democratic show no adverse reaction toward democracy. The results provide a positive outlook on the resilience of preference for democracy in the face of adversity.
Distributive politics and asymmetric mobilization (with Victor Araújo)
Forthcoming at the Journal of Theoretical Politics.
Abstract: Can broadly targeted welfare policy create electoral dynamics similar to particularistic strategies? We theorize a novel mechanism, we call asymmetric mobilization, which explains mobilization as a self-selection process induced by a broadly targeted benefit. Asymmetric mobilization is based on incomplete information of citizens about the de facto allocation of benefits. When citizens expect particularistic allocation, and access to the benefit depends on voter registration, supporters of the incumbent, who supplies the benefit, self-select into the electorate. This creates an incumbency advantage. We illustrate the argument using the case of the Renda Básica de Cidadania (RBC) in Maricá, Brazil, the largest unconditional cash transfer program in Latin America. Based on qualitative evidence we develop our argument in a formal model, which we test against novel survey data. We find that under the de facto procedure of implementation, supporters of the incumbent supplying the RBC, self-select into the electorate, and engage more in activities, which signal party loyalty.
Lies can backfire: How exposure of government dishonesty restores accountability despite misinformation (with Victor Araújo)
Under review.
Abstract: Do voters punish rulers who spread misinformation when confronted with the truth? We address this question through the lens of the Covid-19 pandemic in Brazil. Despite a massive misinformation campaign in an already polarized society, Bolsonaro lost the elections in 2022. We argue that markers of the true state of the world, i.e. unambiguous evidence that contradicts governmental misinformation, expose the government as dishonest. Since citizens dislike dishonest politicians, misinformation can backfire electorally. We show that voters in polling stations closer to hospitals with more intensive care units (ICUs), which proxy for salient markers of the true state of the world, punished Bolsonaro more in the 2022 Presidential Election. The effect is sizeable, if information exposure had been 5 points lower (on a 10-point scale) the election result would be flipped.
Stabile Demokratie in Krisenzeiten: Lokale Coronafälle haben bei der bayerischen Kommunalwahl die Wähler nicht abgeschreckt (with Sebastian Blesse and Felix Rösel, ifo Dresden berichtet 3/2020)
Abstract: A short policy report – in German – about the impact of the first occurrences of Covid-19 during the municipal elections in Bavaria on electoral outcomes. Comparing changes of electoral outcomes within municipalities with and without Covid-19 cases, we do not find any evidence that voters were abstaining due to local Covid-19 incidence.
Abstrakt: Am 15. März 2020 fanden in Bayern die Kommunalwahlen statt – mitten in den Anfangswochen der Coronapandemie in Deutschland. In etwa einem Fünftel der bayerischen Landkreise gab es zu diesem Zeitpunkt aber noch keinen bestätigten Coronafall. Wir vergleichen das Wahlverhalten in diesen Landkreisen mit bayerischen Landkreisen, in denen bereits Corona nachgewiesen wurde. Unsere Ergebnisse deuten nicht darauf hin, dass lokale Coronafälle die Wahlbeteiligung negativ beeinflusst haben. Die Wähler haben sich nicht abschrecken lassen.